County Riverside v. McLaughin , 500 US 44 (1991), is a case of the United States Supreme Court involving the question of whether a suspect arrested without a warrant (an unsecured detention) should be brought to justice in a reasonable amount of time to determine whether there is a possible cause for detaining a suspect in custody.
Video County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
Overview
Case County of Riverside v. McLaughlin (1991) is a court case dealing with the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States in the case of possibilities involving unsecured arrests. In this case, the Fourth Amendment is used by the plaintiff to declare that the clause "warrants should be legally justified with probable cause" also applies to unsecured arrests because it is implied that it would be unreasonable, otherwise < i> unconstitutional , for someone to be arrested without specifying a possible cause. The US Supreme Court also used precedents from previous Supreme Court cases - as in the case of Gerstein v. Pugh (1975) - to reach their final decision.
The lawsuit was filed in 1987 by plaintiff - Donald Lee McLaughlin - against County of Riverside (California). He asked the United States Central District of California to issue an order ordering County to stop its policy on unsecured arrests, arguing that the practice may be unconstitutional. Finally, Riverside District appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit after the District Court favored the plaintiff; The Court of Appeal also agrees with the plaintiff's argument. The case was then filed with the US Supreme Court. In 5-4 votes, Supreme Court judges found that County of Riverside's practice of unsecured arrests was unconstitutional and ruled that a suspect arrested without a warrant should be given a possible cause within 48 hours.
Maps County of Riverside v. McLaughlin
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In 1987, the plaintiff - Donald Lee McLaughlin - filed a complaint in the United States District Court (California's Central District) against Riverside County. In it, the complaint alleges that he was imprisoned in Riverside County Prison without a prosecutor (or law enforcement officer) explaining to him the reason he was arrested (probable cause). McLaughlin requested an injunction from a judge that would require the defendants and the County to grant the arrested without reason for probate in a reasonable amount of time.
Riverside County responded to this lawsuit by saying that McLaughlin had no legal standing to file a lawsuit against County because, based on Los Angeles City v. Lyons (1983), he fails to show that he will go to submit to unconstitutional acts by the County, such as possible culpable detention. County requested that the lawsuit be dismissed. During this time, a second complaint was changed received (as an individual and class representative), which added three more plaintiffs - John E. James, Diana Ray Simon, and Michael Scott Hyde - who alleged that law enforcement officers arrested them without a warrant and detained without any possible cause.
In 1989, the plaintiff asked the District Court judge to issue an order instructing County Riverside to provide a possible reason to those detained in a reasonable amount of time. The judge granted the request based on a precedent that County practice violated the US Supreme Court's decision in the case of Gerstein . Riverside County then appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; The Ninth Circuit combines McLaughlin along with McGregor v. County San Bernardino (9th Cir 1989) because of the similarity between cases, and upholding commands on the ground that County has violated the precedent set by the case of Gerstein . The Ninth Circuit records that prisoners "are in custody and sustained injuries due to the actions of accused suspects unconstitutional". The case then goes to the US Supreme Court for review.
Court Opinion
In 5-4 votes, the Court ruled that a suspect arrested without a warrant should be given a possible cause within 48 hours of their arrest. Using the precedent set by the case of Gerstein - where the Supreme Court ruled that Florida's practice of holding suspects for 30 days without probable cause was unconstitutional - and a close interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, they found that Riverside Practice County to withhold the suspect in custody without the possible cause of the determination is illegal detention (or withheld at no charge). Illegal detention will inevitably violate the unreasonable clause of search and seizure of the Fourth Amendment; holding the possibility of determining the cause for the suspect would also violate the Fourth Amendment as well.
Judge O'Connor, joined by Justice Rehinquist and White Judge Kennedy and Souter, wrote the Court's opinion, stating:
This is not to say that the determination of possible causes in a particular case passes a constitutional call simply because it is given within 48 hours. Such hearing may still violate Gerstein if the captured individual can prove that the determination of the cause of the possibility is postponed unfairly. Examples of unreasonable delays are delays for the purpose of collecting additional evidence to justify arrests, delays motivated by ill will against the individuals arrested, or delaying delays. In evaluating whether the delay in a particular case makes no sense, however, the court should allow a large degree of flexibility. Courts can not ignore the often unavoidable delays in transporting arrested persons from one facility to another, handling late night reservations where no judge is available, obtaining the presence of a capturing officer who may be busy processing other suspects or securing the place of arrest, and other practical realities.
Where the captured individual does not accept the determination of possible causes within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the captured individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Instead, the burden shifts to the government to indicate a bona fide emergency or other exceptional circumstances. The fact that in certain cases may take more than 48 hours to consolidate pre-trial processes does not qualify as exceptional circumstances. Also, in this case, conduct weekend interventions. Jurisdictions that choose to offer the combined process should do so as soon as possible, but not later than 48 hours after the arrest
Justice O'Connor rejected the County of Riverside claim that "accusing a personal injury is traceable enough to the behavior of a suspected defendant and likely to be corrected by the requested assistance"; they argued that plaintiffs who were arrested and detained without cause of possible determination suffered direct (emotional) injuries because they were not given a reason for their arrest. The verdict states that any suspect arrested without a warrant by law enforcement must know why they were arrested (the determination of probable cause) of the judge within 48 hours, except by an emergency.
Dissent
The two Judges separately disagreed: Judge Scalia and Marshall Judge, joined Blackmun and Stevens Judges. Marshall's justice is of the opinion:
In Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 US 103 (1975), the Court declares that an individual detained after unsecured arrest is entitled to the "immediate" decision of a possible cause as a precondition for further detention. on his freedom. See ID., 114-116, 125. I agree with Judge Scalia that a probable cause of trial is quite "fast" under Gerstein only when given immediately after the completion of "incident administrative steps to capture," id., at 114. View post, at 4-5. Since the Court of Appeal correctly states that County Riverside must provide probable cause-and-effect as soon as it completes the incident of the administrative step for the arrest, see 888 F. 2d 1276, 1278 (CA9 1989), I will affirm the Court of Appeal's decision. Thus, I do not agree
Judge Marshall thought that the precedent of the Gernstein case was sufficient to determine the "immediate" release of the probable cause for the suspect in unsecured arrest, and that the reason for the majority was excessive.
Judge Scalia offers a more detailed perspective on his dissent, which states:
Today, however, the Court found something very different at Gerstein . He found that the simple statements mentioned above (not to mention the tradition of civilized freedom upon which they were based) were defeated by the implications of a later dictum which, according to the Court, manifests a "recognition that the Fourth Amendment does not impose the immediate determination of probable cause after resolve the incident of an administrative step for arrest. "Ante, at 8 (emphasis added). Of course Gerstein does not say, I also do not think that an "immediate" determination is required. But what the Court today means by "not immediately" is that the delay can be caused by something other than resolving incidents of administrative measures to capture and regulate judges - that is, for the convenience of the administration combining the possibility of determination with other state processes. The result, we learned later in the opinion, is that what Gerstein meant by "a brief period of detention to take the administrative step of the incident to be arrested" is two full days. I think it is clear that the case is not said or means something like that....
... Of course even if the implications of the dictum in Gerstein are what the Court says, it would be a bad excuse to arrest a wrong citizen arrested in a prison as opposed to a clear order of the Amendment Fourth. What most expresses the fragility of opinion today is that it does not depend on anything but the implications of a dictum, coupled with its own assumption (which is quite irrefutable because it is fully loaded) "balancing" competing demands from individuals and the State. With regard to the points at issue here, different times and different places - even very liberal times and places - have reached that balance in different ways. Some Western democracies today allow executive arrest for no impartiality. In Britain, for example, Terrorism Prevention 1989, 14 (4), 5, allows suspects to be held without presentation and without charge for seven days. 12 Halsbury Statistics. 1294 (fourth edition 1989). It is the intention of the Fourth Amendment to place this issue beyond the time, place and predilection of the judiciary, incorporating traditional customary law guarantees against unlawful arrests. The court says not a word about this guarantee, and they are decisive. Gerstein's approval of the "brief period" of delays to complete the "incident of administrative measures for arrest" is already a questionable extension of traditional formulations, although it may have little practical effect and may be justified on the basis of de minimis. [n.2] In order to expand Gerstein , however, being authorized for the 48-hour detention related to both obtaining judges and administrative "arrest" arrests seems to me completely unjustifiable. Mr. McLaughlin is entitled to have an impartial determination that there is a reason to remove his freedom - not in accordance with the schedule in accordance with the convenience of the State in various processes, but as soon as his arrest is complete and the judge can be obtained.
Judge Scalia believes that the Court considers the precedent set up in the case of Gerstein in terms of issues related to unsecured arrests more than enough in determining when a probable cause is set for the suspect. He also argues that the court ignores the Fourth Amendment guarantees outlined in terms of detaining people in custody. Finally, Judge Scalia believes that the Court's further interpretation of the Gerstein case to mandate that law enforcement should determine possible causes in a certain period of time is not required; he felt that it was totally unrelated to cleaning up administrative matters related to the arrest or assigning a judge to a suspect case. He also feels that the determination of possible causes for suspects arrested without warrants should be less stringent.
Next development
Base County Riverside v. McLaughlin is used in a different opinion at Powell v. Nevada (1994).
Note
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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