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Grimshaw v ford motor company essay Homework Help opessayeysk ...
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Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company (119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr.348) is a personal injury lawsuit that was decided in Orange County California in February 1978 and affirmed by the California court of appeal in May 1981 The suit involved the safety of Ford Pinto's car design, manufactured by Ford Motor Company. The jury gave the plaintiff $ 127.8 million in compensation, the largest in US product liability and personal injury cases. Grimshaw v. The Ford Motor Company is one of the most publicized of more than a hundred lawsuits filed against Ford in connection with the back-end accident at Pinto.

Upon appealing, Ford fought the court's verdict on the basis of a mistake, and fought over the punitive verdict on the grounds of the absence of a crime and that the punitive damages were not authorized and unconstitutional. The appeals court confirmed the trial court.


Video Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.



Trial

The rear and fire impacts of Pinto in 1972 in Orange County, California resulted in the death of Lily Gray's driver and a severe injury to passenger Richard Grimshaw. Lawsuits are merged to stand trial. The jury awarded $ 127.8 million for damages; $ 125 million in damages and $ 2,841,000 in damages to Grimshaw and $ 665,000 in damages to the Gray family. The jury award is the largest in US product liability and personal injury cases. The jury award is the largest against automakers up to $ 150 million at Hardy vs. General Motors in 1996.

The judge reduced the jury's compensation penalty for damages of up to $ 3.5 million, which he later said "is still greater than any other punishment in the state with a factor of around five."

Reactions

Los Angeles University law professor Gary T. Schwartz, writing in 1990, says that the jury's decision is plausible, and that the "core of the Pinto story" is:

Given the description of the Pinto design problem, some comments can be offered on the decision-making process at Ford that generates Pinto. As shown above, Ford's famous report can not be construed as showing Ford balancing life against the dollar in designing Pinto. To argue that the report itself does not reveal such a process is meaningless, however, that such a process does not occur. Therefore, I have consulted Grimshaw's notes to learn what light is being shed on this question. As far as the location of the basic fuel tank is concerned, I am sure that baggage capacity issues, in conjunction with American car habits, provide the best explanation for Ford's choice to place the Pinto gas tank behind the axle. As for additional design proposals put forward by plaintiffs, some of them-for example, bladders in a gas tank, and "tank in the tank" -a stop a somewhat innovative technology that was never used in actual automated production. At the trial, there was a testimony that the bladder would be feasible in the early 1970s, but also testimony to deny that the bladder is currently beyond the limits of eligibility. The jury's general verdict does not disclose whether and how the jury resolves such conflicts in evidence; and I'm not in a position to finish it here. Consider now, however, the combination of a more powerful, bolt-free (differential) bumper differential, and the addition of both cap parts and horizontal cross-members. This combination of design changes will obviously improve Pinto's security to some extent. According to evidence, the overall cost of this combination is $ 9; and it is reasonable to assume that these items were rejected by Ford in Pinto planning mainly because of their monetary costs. It is reasonable to believe, then, that because of these costs, Ford decided not to improve Pinto's design, knowing that his decision would increase the chances of loss of life of the consumer. Once misunderstandings are stripped away, the essence of Pinto's limited story remains. And this is the core that may be strong enough to support the "myth" of the Ford Pinto case in the second sense described above. Here is my attempt to explain the mythical elements.

According to the Los Angeles Times in 2010, the award "signaled to the auto industry that it would be subject to tough sanctions for ignoring the known defects."

Maps Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.



Appeal

In discussing the findings of the court of appeals the fact Schwartz (1990) notes that the appeal court is under strict interpretation rules. He stated:

For reasons beyond the control of the court, his opinion should be treated with caution as the source of actual facts. Because the defendant appealed the jury's decision in favor of the plaintiff, the court was obliged to look at all the evidence in the manner most favorable to the plaintiffs and essentially ignore the evidence in the record that might favor the defendant. View id. at 773, 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359, 388. In fact, Ford's basic position at the hearing - which, according to the court's opinion without mentioning it, is that the approaching Ford (Ford Galaxie) does not slow down at all, and has hit Gray's car at speeds in excess of 50 miles per hour. There is a lot of evidence in court that supports each of the factual claims of the parties regarding the Galaxie closing speed. If the jury accepts Ford's speed estimates, there will not be many scarcity problems: because the plaintiff's position during the trial is that even advanced fuel systems can not maintain integrity within 50 miles per hour collision.

Appeal court findings about fact

Court findings of facts about accidents, Pinto designs, Ford crash tests, and Ford's cost benefit analysis were not opposed to appeals, and accepted by the court of appeal "in accordance with the principles set forth in the appellate review."

Accident

A 1972 Ford Pinto hatchback stalled on the freeway, erupting into flames when it was terminated by Ford Galaxie moving in the same direction. Lilly Gray, Pinto's driver, suffered severe burns throughout his body and resulted in his death from congestive heart failure. Richard Grimshaw, 13, a passenger, suffered severe burns and permanent disfigurement throughout his body. Grimshaw underwent many skin grafts and major surgery, but still lost the fingers in his left hand and his left ear in the accident. Doctors estimate that Grimshaw will need more surgery within the next 10 years.

The plaintiff testified that Pinto's gas tank was pushed forward by impact and punctured by a flange or bolt in a differential housing. The fuel is sprayed from the tank and into the passenger compartment through the gap between the rear wheel and floor wells.

Pinto Fuel System Design

In 1968, Ford began designing a subcompact car that would eventually be known as Pinto.

The court found that Lee Iacocca, at the time of the vice president at Ford, compiled the project "Pinto and its power move" and said that "Ford's goal is to build cars with or under 2,000 pounds to sell for no more than $ 2,000." The court described Pinto as a "rush project," and says that while the automotive industry's standard practice is that "engineering studies precede styling," in the case of the Pinto project "styling precedes engineering and engineering design dictated to a greater than ordinary level."

The court found that the Pinto style requires a gasoline tank to be placed behind the rear axle, rather than above the rear axle such as "preferred practice in Europe and Japan" and that Pinto has "only 9 or 10 inches" of "crush room," "much more slightly less than in any other American automaker or Ford's overseas subcompact. "The court found that the Pinto bumper" is slightly more than a chrome strip, less than any other American car bumper produced at that time or later. " The court found that the rear structure of Pinto's lack of reinforcement "was found in all cars manufactured by Ford's overseas operations," making Pinto "less crush-resistant than any other vehicle." The court found that the flange and bolt lines on the Pinto differential housing "are sufficient to pierce the gas tank that is pushed forward during a collision at the rear."

Crash Test

Ford tested two Pinto production models and prototypes, some of which were "completely duplicates of the design car," "to determine, inter alia, the integrity of the fuel system in crashes on the back end." The proposed federal regulations require a "no significant fuel spill" impact, up to 20 miles per hour (32 km/h) of impact in 1972 and 30 miles per hour (48 km/h) in 1973.

The trial proves that Pinto can not meet the proposed regulations. The collision from behind "causes the fuel tank to be pushed forward and punctured, causing a fuel leak." Pinto's collision production "causes the fuel neck to tear from the gas tank and the tank will be punctured by the head of the bolt in the differential housing." In at least one test collision, "spilled fuel enters the driver compartment through the gap resulting from the separation of connections connecting the rear wheel wells to the floor pan," partial separation due to "lack of reinforcement in the rear structure."

Ford tested a modified Pinto prototype, which "proved safe at the speed at which Pinto failed," including modifications to coat the fuel tank with a rubber bladder, to find the fuel tank above rather than behind the rear axle, and to increase the gain.

Cost to Fix Design Shortcomings

The court found that, while "maintenance standards for engineers in the industry" after failed security tests were to "redesign and retest," and although the fixes were not expensive, "Ford produces and sells Pinto to the public without doing anything to it.. "

Design changes that will improve the fuel system at very little cost include:

  • Long-term member: $ 2.40 ea.
  • Cross members: $ 1.80 ea.
  • Shock absorbs "bulletproof" for fuel tank: $ 4.00
  • The tank in the tank and the placement of the tank above the rear axle: $ 5.08 to $ 5.79
  • The nylon bladder in the tank: $ 5.25 to $ 8.00
  • Placement of the tank above the rear axle with a protective barrier: $ 9.95
  • Substitution of the rear axle with a fine differential housing: $ 2.10
  • Shield shield between differential housing and fuel tank: $ 2.35
  • Enhanced and strengthened rear bumper: $ 2.60
  • An additional 8 inch (200 mm) crush room: $ 6.40

Equipping cars with reinforced rear structure, smooth axle, better bumpers, and additional crush space for a total cost of $ 15.30 will make the fuel tank safe in clashes at the rear 34-38 hours per hour by vehicle. the size of Ford Galaxie. If, in addition to the previously mentioned, the bladder or tank in the tank is used or if the tank is protected with a shield, it will be safe within 40-45-hour per hour impact impact. If the tank has been placed above the rear axle, it will be safe in impact back at 50 miles per hour or more.

Knowledge management

The Pinto project team held a regular product review meeting led and attended by Ford's vice president. Pinto is approved by Ford's Product Planning Committee, including Iacocca and other Ford vice presidents. At a product review meeting in April 1971, a report prepared by Ford engineers entitled "Fuel System Integrity Evaluation Program" was distributed and discussed, referring to Ford's vehicle collision test and estimating the financial impact of design changes to comply with fuel system integrity standards federal proposals. The report suggests delaying improvements in order to obtain cost savings. Harley Copp, a former Ford engineer and executive in charge of the crash test program, "testified that Ford's top management level made the decision to go ahead with Pinto's production, knowing that the gas tank is vulnerable to puncture and rupture at low rear impact speeds that create the risk of death or significant injury from fire and knowing that 'fixes' are worth the nominal cost. "

Appeal disposition

The appeals court confirmed the trial court.

Defendant's Appeal

Ford fought the court's verdict on the basis of a mistake, and fought over the verdict of punitive damages for the absence of a crime and that punitive damages were not authorized and unconstitutional.

Error

The appeals court "concluded that Ford had failed to show that there were errors or irregularities that occurred during the trial that resulted in the failure of the judiciary requiring a reversal."

Ford argues that the trial court incorrectly acknowledged Ford's "Financial Systems Integrity Assessment" report as irrelevant and disadvantageous. In the document, Ford engineers suggested delaying the installation of a "flak" or "bladder suit", which was available at a cost of $ 4 to $ 8 per car, in all Ford cars up to 1976, allowing the company to realize savings of $ 20.9 million. The appellate court ruled that the report was highly relevant in "A reasonable conclusion can be drawn from evidence that although management's knowledge that the Pinto fuel system can be made safe at cost but $ 4 to $ 8 per car, it decides to delay corrective action to save money and increase profits. "

Additional damage

Ford opposes punitive damages for two reasons: 1) legal and constitutionally indemnification is not permitted in cases of design flaws; and 2) there is no evidence support to find hatred or corporate responsibility for crime.

Shelter damage in case of design flaws

The appeals court found no legal barrier to punitive damages and said that "Ford believes that the law was unconstitutional has been repeatedly denied."

Malice

Ford argues that the "Exemplary Damage" part of California's civil code requires "evil motives," or the intent to injure the aggrieved, for redress, and argue for no crime. The appellate court cited the precedent that "malice" as used in the "Exemplary Damage" code in California included "not only malicious intent to injure certain people who were harmed but evincing" consciously ignored the possibility that an actor's behavior would result in injury. to others. "" In Taylor v. The Court of Appeal, the California High Court stated that consciously disregarding the safety of others is sufficient to meet the malus animus required for punitive damages, added: "In To justify the granting of punitive damages on this basis, determined that the defendant was aware of the possible harmful consequences of his conduct, and that he deliberately and deliberately failed to avoid such consequences. "In a commercial context, the imposition of punitive damages impedes the progress of" objective corporate policy "and encourages the restoration of security problems that may be out of control.

According to the appeals court decision,

There is ample evidence to support Ford's discovery of hatred and responsibility for crime. Through crash test results, Ford knows that the Pinto fuel tank and rear structure will expose consumers to serious injury or death in a 20 to 30 miles per hour collision. There is evidence that Ford could correct hazardous design defects at minimal cost but decided to delay shortage correction by engaging in a cost-benefit analysis balancing the lives of people and limbs against corporate profits. Ford's institutional mentality proved to be one of indifference to public security. There is substantial evidence that Ford's behavior is "consciously ignoring" the possibility of injury to members of society consuming... There is substantial evidence that management is aware of crash tests that indicate the vulnerability of the Pinto fuel tank to rupture at low speed back impacts with significant risk of injury or death consequences of the occupants by fire. There are testimonies from several sources that the test results are forwarded to the chain of command:... Despite much indirect evidence, there is substantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that Ford's management decided to continue production. of Pinto with knowledge of the test results reveals design flaws that make the fuel tank extremely vulnerable to rear impact at low speed and endanger the safety and life of the occupants. Such behavior is a corporate crime.

Ford argues that the amount awarded in redress is excessive. The test to decide whether the amount is excessive as a matter of law or highly disproportionate to increase the assumption that it is the result of desire or prejudice is four branches: 1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's behavior; 2) the wealth of the accused; 3) the amount of compensation compensation; and 4) the amount that will serve as a deterrent effect on the same behavior as the defendant and others. The appellate court ruled it out

... Ford's management behavior is extremely deplorable. It demonstrates a conscious and unfeeling indifference to public safety in order to maximize corporate profits... The heavy-hearted behavior of Ford jeopardizes the lives of thousands of Pinto buyers. Considering to the factor of reprehensibility, the award of punitive damages reduced by court judges is not excessive. "

Given the $ 7.7 billion net worth of Ford and 983 million dollars of taxable income in 1976, the court found that the sentence's ruling was approximately 0.005% of Ford's net worth and 0.03% of its revenue. The compensation damages to compensation damages are about 1.4: 1. Significantly, Ford does not argue about the excess compensation compensation. Finally, the reward of punishment is enough to require Ford to pay attention, rather than allowing the company to write it as a mere business expense.

Plaintiff' s Appeal

Grimshaw's appeal from a command that provides a conditional new test and of a modified verdict entered in accordance with the command. Grimshaw argues that 1) the punishment of damages is granted by a jury where it is not excessive as a matter of law; 2) the specification of the reason is inadequate; and 3) the court misuses its wisdom in dramatically cutting rewards. The appellate court stated that the trial did nothing wrong in reducing the jury of sentences of more than 122 million to 3.5 million or in giving a new trial for excessive damage. There is no evidence to suggest that a court judge misuses his wisdom, or that he acts in any manner that is unfair and reasonable in that situation.

Why the Ford Pinto didn't suck
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See also

  • Mcgee v. General Motors
  • World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson
  • Dodge v. Ford Motor Company

Why the Ford Pinto didn't suck
src: i.kinja-img.com


References


Ford Pinto T-shirt flaming Pinto
src: hanabi.autoweek.com


Bibliography

  • Gladwell, Malcolm (May 4, 2015). "The Engineer's Lament". The New Yorker . Retrieved March 3rd, 2016 .
  • Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. , 119 CA3d 757 (Application Cal.. 1981).
  • Sherefkin, Robert (June 16, 2003). "Pinto Lee Iacocca: Fierce Failure". Automotive News . Retrieved March 6, 2016 .

Why the Ford Pinto didn't suck
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External links

  • GRIMSHAW v. FORD MOTOR CO. (1981) 119 CA3d 757

Source of the article : Wikipedia

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